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I. Introduction 
In today’s consumer market, nearly all technological products contain 
standardized components and implement standardized functions.1 Standardization 
is required for the product’s functionality because many components need to be 
combined to create a final technological product.2 Standardization also provides 
numerous benefits to consumers and producers. Consumers benefit through lower 
prices, increased options, and greater innovation,3 while producers benefit through 
lower research and development costs, reduced time to market, greater sales, and 
increased competition.4 
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 1. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 
1896 (2002). 
 2. See Edith Ramirez, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Before the U. S. Comm. on the Judiciary Concerning Oversight of the Impact on Competition of 
Exclusion Order to Enforce Standard-Essential Patents 4 (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-concerning-oversight-i 
mpact-competition-exclusion-orders/120711standardpatents.pdf [hereinafter FTC Oversight] (discussing the 
“inoperability problem”). 
 3. See Suzanne Munck, Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement 
of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Before the U.S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition 
Policy and Consumer Rights Concerning Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law 4 (July 30, 
2013) (“Inclusion of patented technologies in a standard can benefit consumers because it allows SSOs and their 
members to choose from a broader set of available technologies. . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 4. Daniele Gerundino & Michael Hilb, The ISO Methodology: Assessing the Economic Benefits of Standards, 
ISO FOCUS+, June 2010, at 10, 12, 14, available at http://www.iso.org/sites/TC_Chairs_2011/assets/Gerudino_H 
ilb_ISO%20Focus%2010-06-E.pdf. 
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Nevertheless, these proposed benefits can often be delayed or even unrealized 
due to the patent hold-up game. The “game” begins when technology firms have 
the good fortune of having their patented technologies selected as part of an 
industry standard.5 The selected patents are designated as “essential” to the standard 
and the patent owners become “standard-essential patent” (“SEP”) holders.6 Once 
the standard is implemented, SEP holders “use the leverage that they may acquire as 
a result of the standard setting process to negotiate higher royalty rates or other 
favorable terms after the standard is adopted than they could have credibly 
demanded beforehand”7 or “hold-up” their SEP by threatening patent infringement 
litigation.8 By threatening costly litigation, SEP holders deter companies from 
pursuing innovation.9 In the end, consumers are the ultimate losers because they 
are forced to pay higher prices due to a decrease in product selection and lack of 
innovation that results from patent hold-up.10 
Notwithstanding the detrimental impact on consumers and the economy, courts 
and administrative agencies have applied injunctive relief in SEP litigation 
inconsistently, thereby failing to deter SEPs from engaging in self-serving patent 
hold-up actions.11 The U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”) have also failed to provide guidance on this issue.12 In 
addition, administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), 
have failed to deter patent hold-up despite their significant role in funding research 
and development in the private industry.13 
Since the courts and administrative agencies have failed to properly define and 
limit the scope of injunctive relief in SEP litigation, Congress should provide direct 
guidance on this issue, but has failed to do so. The Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act is the only legislation that even tangentially addresses the issue of patent hold-
 
 5. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against 
Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 
1, 1. 
 6. See Munck, supra note 3, at 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted). 
 9. See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 401, 429 
(2013). 
 10. See Stewart Mitchell, Microsoft and Apple Patents “Push Up Price of Android”, PC PRO (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/369100/microsoft-and-apple-patents-push-up-price-of-android (stating that 
Google’s patent war with Apple and Microsoft could lead to price increases for Google’s Android phones and 
less handset choice). 
 11. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 12. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 13. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 30 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter 
FTC Innovation] (“In FY 2003, federal investment in R&D hit a new record of $117 billion, a 13.8 percent 
increase over FY 2002 and the largest dollar increase in history.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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up, but it only limits the ability of SEP holders to join unrelated parties to a patent 
suit.14 As such, this legislation does not clarify or limit the scope of injunctive relief 
for potential abuse by SEPs.15 
Given that the courts, administrative agencies, and Congress have failed to deter 
SEPs from engaging in self-serving patent hold-up, this Comment proposes ways to 
prevent it. Part II discusses the patent system, standardization, and how they 
contribute to the patent hold-up game. Part III identifies issues embedded within 
standardization and discusses how these problems permit SEP holders to 
continually engage in patent hold-up. Finally, Part IV proposes ways to deter patent 
hold-up by discussing changes to standardization, which will allow producers and 
consumers to finally realize the benefits of standardization. 
II. The Patent System and Standardization 
The goal of the patent system is to encourage firms to innovate against any fears of 
risk or high cost.16 Patents give their owners the right to prevent others from 
making, using, or selling any patented products within the United States during the 
term of the patent.17 This exclusive right allows innovators to recoup their 
investment in research and development (“R&D”) because prices for their product 
will not be lowered due to competition from “copycats” in the market throughout 
the duration of their patent.18 
A. Standard-Setting Organizations 
Due to the complexity of its products, the technology industry requires 
standardization.19 This is mainly due to the fact that popular products, including 
 
 14. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2011). 
 15. Charles Gorenstein, America Invents Act Exercises “Con-Troll” Over Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG 
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/19/controll-over-patent-litigation/id=19279 (describing 
the Act’s joinder restrictions, but noting that it is so far unclear how the courts will interpret this provision). 
 16. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH 
COMPETITION 1 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
EVOLVING]. 
 17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 18. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 1 (“By preventing copying that might otherwise drive down prices, 
the patent system allows innovators to recoup their investment in research and development (R&D).”). 
 19. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES 
FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf (“Interoperability standards have paved the way for 
moving many important innovations into the marketplace, including the complex communications networks 
and sophisticated mobile computing devices that are hallmarks of the modern age.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & 
Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009–10 (2007) (arguing that patent 
hold-up is most prevalent in multi-component technological products because you cannot separate the 
infringing component from non-infringing ones after production).  
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smart phones, laptop and tablet computers, and gaming consoles, all depend on 
hundreds of different inventions working together in a single system.20 These 
technologies may also create an “interoperability” problem because there are too 
many inventions that must work together to create one product.21 
To address the interoperability issue, various industries have established 
standard-setting organizations (“SSO”) to determine the standards that firms will 
follow to create their products.22 These SSOs typically consists of a combination of 
universities, private companies, vendors, and government agencies.23 For example, 
the Telecommunications Industry Association is an association of providers of 
communications and information technology products and services that prepares 
standards for performance testing and compatibility.24 The XMPP Standards 
Foundation is an independent, nonprofit standards development organization 
whose experts define open protocols for presence, instant messaging, and real-time 
communication.25 
While it seems anticompetitive to allow interested industry members and 
competitors to develop new technology together,26 patent and antitrust laws are 
“complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and 
competition.”27 The Patent Clause “reflects a balance between the need to encourage 
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition” by limiting 
the duration of the patent.28 Competition stimulates innovation by incentivizing 
firms to design new or better products and processes under the protection of patent 
rights.29 Therefore, the economic benefits gained from standardization are generally 
seen to outweigh the risks of collusion and price-fixing violations, so long as 
 
 20. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 4. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 
1896 (2002) (defining a standard as “any set of technological specifications that either provides or is intended to 
provide a common design for a product or process”). 
 23. See Sector Members, Associates, and Academia, INT’L TELECOMMS. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/mem 
bership/Pages/sector-members.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 24. About, TIA ADVANCED GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, http://www.tiaonline.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 25. About, XMPP STANDARDS FOUNDATION, http://xmpp.org/about-xmpp/xsf/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 26. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (“Any combination which 
tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity.”). 
 27. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal citations 
omitted); see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (discussing how federal 
patent laws embody “a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that 
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a 
competitive economy”). 
 28. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
 29. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 2. 
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discussions regarding new standards are approached from a purely technical point 
of view.30 
B. Standardization 
During standardization, companies who voluntarily belong to SSOs are typically 
required to disclose patents or patent applications that would potentially be used in 
the industry standard.31 In other words, members only need to disclose their patents 
when there is some reasonable expectation that a license is needed to implement the 
standard.32 While SEPs are being identified by the SSO for the industry standard, 
companies must consent to enter license negotiations with anyone who wishes to 
implement the standard.33 Approximately 63% of organizations require the use of 
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (“FRAND” or “RAND”) in their 
licenses.34 Non-discriminatory means that “a patentee who makes or sells compliant 
products cannot charge a higher royalty to an implementer against whom the 
patentee competes directly than to another party who sells very distinct compliant 
products.”35 
SSOs will then create standards to ensure that companies will communicate with 
each other and standardize the use of critical technologies.36 If a company’s patent is 
implemented in the standard, the firm is known as a SEP.37 Once a standard is 
 
 30. BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD, DENNIS P. O’REILLEY & D. BRIAN KACEDON, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS § 29.01.G, at 422 (6th ed. 2008) (internal citation omitted). 
 31. Id. at 423 (discussing Rambus’ duty to disclose its patents during standardization) (internal citation 
omitted); see Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[U]nder such an 
amorphous duty [to disclose], any patent or application having a vague relationship to the standard would have 
to be disclosed. [SSO] members would be required to disclose improvement patents, implementation patents, 
and patents directed to the testing of standard-compliant devices–even though the standard itself could be 
practiced without licenses under such patents.”).  
 32. Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1100–01 (“Rambus’s duty to disclose extended only to claims in patents or 
applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.”). 
 33. See Michele K. Herman, Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses: How the Deal Is Done, A.B.A. 
SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25
TH
 ANNUAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW CONFERENCE (Apr. 7–10, 
2010). 
 34. Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical 
Analysis, 19 n.20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11156, 2006), available at http://ww 
w.nber.org/papers/w11156.pdf (“The majority (63%) of organizations use RAND in the patent licensing rules. 
Only 9% of organizations use royalty-free rules. Even fewer organizations use assignment (2%) and compulsory 
rules (2%).”). 
 35. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1149 n.42 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley 2013]. 
 36. See FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 2. 
 37. See Standardized Technology and Standard-Essential Patents, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov 
/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc-competiti 
on-concerns-markets-devices-smart/130103google-seps.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
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established, SEP holders are expected to uphold their prior RAND commitments 
and enter into negotiations with any firm that is seeking a license based on the 
standard.38 Yet as Judge Posner previously noted, “once a patent becomes essential 
to a standard, the patentee’s bargaining power surges because a prospective licensee 
has no alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the patentee’s mercy.”39 This is the 
beginning of the patent hold-up game.40 
C. The Patent Hold-Up Game 
Theoretically, there are many economic benefits in standardizing technology,41 but 
the patent hold-up game diminishes any such benefit (except for the SEP holder). 
When an SSO incorporates a patented technology into the adopted standard, 
industry participants will make investments according to this new standard.42 In 
reliance of this standard, participants will often make sunk-cost investments43 
without realizing that the technology may implicate another participant’s patent.44 
It is then no longer feasible for firms to deviate from the standard because they 
“face substantial switching costs in abandoning initial designs and substituting a 
different technology.”45 As a result, a SEP holder disregards its initial commitment 
to license its patent on RAND terms46 and instead, “holds up” its patent to negotiate 
higher royalty rates and other favorable terms than would have been possible prior 
to the standard adoption, or threaten costly litigation and an injunction.47 
III. Standardization Issues that Permit Patent Hold-Up 
There are a number of issues in standardization that allow SEP holders to 
continually engage in patent hold-up. First, companies may fail to provide proper 
notice of their patent interests in an attempt to obtain future profit.48 Second, 
 
 38. See Herman, supra note 33, at 2. 
 39. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 40. See infra Part II.C. The patent hold-up game may also be referred to as “patent hold-up.” 
 41. See FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 4 (“[S]tandards can create enormous value for consumers by 
increasing competition, innovation, product quality, and choice.”). 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. See Unsinkable Sunk Cost, LIVING ECON., http://livingeconomics.org/article.asp?docId=37 (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2013) (defining “sunk cost” as a “[c]ost that cannot be recovered or diverted towards alternative uses”). 
 44. Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1179 
(2009) (“The elements of patent hold up . . . are present [when] the patent reads on a component of a 
multicomponent end product, the owner is a nonmanufacturing patentee, and the prospect of obtaining 
injunctive relief ex post facilitates the extraction of substantially higher royalties than would be attributable to 
the value of the patented feature alone.”). 
 45. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 5. 
 46. Ginsburg, Owings & Wright, supra note 5, at 1. 
 47. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 5. 
 48. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
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companies are expected to license their patents on “reasonable” terms but 
reasonableness has not been clearly defined, which has resulted in significant 
litigation.49 Third, even if a company is found to have engaged in patent hold-up, 
the available patent remedies are inappropriate for patent hold-up because they 
may not apply or do not adequately compensate aggrieved companies.50 
A. Notice Issues 
During standardization, notice may fail to adequately inform the participants’ 
expectations on the boundaries of their products. Notice is defined as “how well a 
patent informs the public [a person skilled in the relevant art] of what technology is 
protected.”51 Clear notice is important because it increases innovation by 
encouraging collaboration, technology transfer, and design-around.52 Clearly-
defined patent rights also help companies easily identify and license technology they 
wish to develop or adopt.53 On the other hand, poor patent notice can undermine 
innovation because “potential collaborators or licensees may not find relevant 
patents, or they may hesitate to invest in technology when the scope of patent 
protection is unclear.”54 
During standardization, patents are included on some reasonable expectation 
that a license is needed to implement the standard.55 Since there is some amount of 
speculation, a producer may unknowingly infringe on a patent that ends up being 
selected for the industry standard. In patent hold-up, SEP holders will rely on this 
unknowing infringement to threaten patent litigation and demand higher 
royalties.56 
B. The Definition of “Reasonable” RAND Terms is Unclear 
SSOs attempt to prevent patent hold-up by requiring participants to license their 
patents on RAND terms.57 Although RAND commitments attempt to solve the 
patent hold-up problem by requiring SEP holders to reveal their licensing terms, 
the SSOs’ failure to clearly define “reasonableness” has resulted in inconsistent 
 
 49. See infra Part III.B. 
 50. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 51. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 2. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (2003) (stating that members only need to 
disclose patents when there is a reasonable expectation that a license is needed to implement the standard). 
 56. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 3 (“When firms choose technologies and market products despite an 
uncertain patent landscape, they risk post-launch patent assertions and litigation.”). 
 57. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 6 (internal citation omitted). 
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application of commitment terms.58 Finding a consistent definition of what 
constitutes a RAND term is difficult because there is no set formula.59 In addition, a 
company’s commitment to an SSO is not an actual license in and of itself; instead, it 
is a willingness to offer a license on RAND terms when the opportunity arises.60 
Therefore, this lack of clarity has caused a significant amount of litigation for firms 
entangled within the patent hold-up game.61 
1. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. 
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., Qualcomm, a wireless telecommunications 
products company, acquired monopoly power in the telecommunications industry 
after convincing an SSO to adopt a standard that incorporated its patents.62 In 
response, Broadcom, a chipset manufacturer, alleged that Qualcomm violated 
antitrust laws by charging more than a RAND fee to the licensees.63 The Third 
Circuit held that “a patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential 
proprietary technology on [RAND] terms . . . is actionable anticompetitive 
conduct.”64 
The case illustrates the court’s failure to adequately define RAND terms, which 
permits SEP holders to continually engage in patent hold-up and makes the future 
of standardization uncertain. On one hand, the Third Circuit’s rule that a SEP 
holder must have committed an “intentional” false promise encourages patent 
hold-up since companies can escape scrutiny by simply claiming that they are 
reneging on their earlier commitment. On the other hand, the future of 
standardization is in jeopardy because high-cost antitrust remedies will deter 
companies from participating in standardization.65 
 
 58. See Jorge L. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies on the 
Development of Voluntary Technical Standards, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. STANDARDS SERVS. GRP., 
GCR 11-934, at 3–4 (June 27, 2011) (discussing “FRAND Licensing Requirements” cases). 
 59. Id. at 1; see also Herman, supra note 33, at 5 (“Some critics argue that RAND is too indefinite and, as a 
result, an implementer may only learn after it is locked into a standard that a patentee’s view of ‘reasonable’ is 
very different from its own. . . . Some similarly argue that the cumulative RAND royalties for patented 
technology incorporated into a standard may turn out to be excessive because there are no specific limitations 
placed on the RAND commitment and no way to gauge in advance of adoption the cumulative amount of 
royalties to be charged.”). 
 60. Herman, supra note 33, at 2. 
 61. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 
(W.D. Wis. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
 62. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d at 304.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 314. 
 65. Kenneth Ewing, Private Anti-Trust Remedies Under US Law, 1 PLC CROSS-BORDER: COMPETITION 
HANDBOOK 87, 87 (2007), available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2804.pdf (“[S]pecial rules, 
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2. Rambus Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission 
The FTC claimed that Rambus, Inc., a technology development firm, deceptively 
failed to disclose the patent interests it held in four technologies that were used to 
standardize a faster architecture for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”) to 
the SSO.66 The SSO adopted an industry standard that caused the SEP holder to gain 
a 90 percent market monopoly over licensing of DRAM technology.67 As a result, 
the FTC found that Rambus breached SSO policies and violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolistic conduct.68 On appeal, the court held 
that there was an insufficient basis for liability. The court noted that even if 
Rambus’ nondisclosure contravened the SSO’s policies, it only prevented the SSO 
from extracting a RAND commitment from Rambus when standardizing its 
technology, which does not constitute an antitrust violation.69 Rambus reiterates the 
importance of incorporating standards that clarify the standardization process.70 
C. Patent Law Remedies are Inappropriate for Patent Hold-up 
While patent law remedies are crucial to promote innovation and 
commercialization of new products,71 these remedies also encourage patent hold-
up. Successful remedies will “compensate for past infringement, prohibit future 
infringement, and deter infringement in the first instance.”72 However, poor notice 
and lack of clarity when it comes to disclosure and reasonableness suggest that the 
full range of available patent law remedies may be inappropriate for patent hold-up 
litigation.73 
 
such as the automatic trebling of damages, award of attorneys’ fees and costs, and aggregation of hundreds to 
thousands or more claims within a single action on behalf of a class of similarly placed claimants, dramatically 
increase both the attractiveness of bringing private claims and the stakes for defendants.”). 
 66. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 67. Id. at 459. 
 68. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof. . . .”). 
 69. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 462. 
 70. Id. at 469 (“[A]lthough antitrust can serve as a useful check on abuses of the standard-setting process, it 
cannot substitute for a general enforcement regime for disclosure rules.” (citing 2 IP & ANTITRUST § 35.5 at 35–
51)). 
 71. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 140. 
 72. Id. at 141. Three types of redress accomplish these tasks: compensatory damages, enhanced damages, 
and injunctive relief. 
 73. See Jorge L. Contreras, So That’s What “RAND” Means?: A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in Microsoft v. Motorola, PATENTLYO (Apr. 27, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04 
/so-thats-what-rand-means-a-brief-report-on-the-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law-in-microsoft-v-mot 
orola.html (“Thus, unlike most patent licensing negotiations, the licensing of standards-essential patents takes 
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1. Compensatory Damages 
Compensatory damages seek to make a patent holder “whole again” in spite of the 
infringement.74 This is accomplished by reflecting the economic realities of the 
market and rendering the “patentee no worse off, but also no better off, than it 
would have been absent the infringement.”75 Two measures are used to calculate 
compensatory damages: lost profits and reasonable royalties.76 “Lost profits” 
assumes that a patent holder is selling a product in the marketplace and seeks its 
entitled return.77 When the patent holder does not actually sell the product, 
compensatory damages are calculated “based on a hypothetical negotiation between 
a willing licensor (the patentee) and a willing licensee (the infringer), otherwise 
known as the ‘reasonable royalty’ analysis.”78 This calculation is based on hypothesis 
because the SEP is not a final product, but rather, a component of the final 
product,79 but is also supported by common law.80 Since it is difficult to conclusively 
determine what is reasonable, aggrieved companies will never become “whole 
again.” Therefore, compensatory damages are an inadequate remedy for patent 
hold-up. 
2. Enhanced Damages 
Enhanced damages are awarded when there has been “willful infringement.”81 The 
concept of “willfulness” generally applies to circumstances where the technology 
 
on a public character. It is not merely a closed-door negotiation between two private parties. It must be 
conducted, and reviewed, with these public benefits in mind.”). 
 74. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 141 (following a finding of infringement, a court shall award damages 
“adequate to compensate for the infringement” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284)); see also Riles v. Shell Exploration & 
Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Compensatory damages, by definition, make the patentee 
whole, as opposed to punishing the infringer.”). 
 75. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 142 (internal citations omitted). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 143. 
 78. Id.  
 79. See supra Part I. 
 80. Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., Inc., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The statute contemplates 
that when a patentee is unable to prove entitlement to lost profits or an established royalty rate, it is entitled to 
‘reasonable royalty’ damages based upon a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and the infringer 
when the infringement began.”). 
 81. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed Cir. 2007) (establishing that willful infringement 
requires clear and convincing evidence that “the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” and that “this objectively-defined risk . . . was either known 
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer”); see also Roderick R. McKelvie et al., 
Nine Unanswered Questions After In re Seagate Technology LLC, 20 INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (“[The Federal 
Circuit held] ‘that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of 
objective recklessness.’ This meant, the court explained, that a person acts ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high 
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious it should be known.’ This new standard requires a party 
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has been in existence for years before the patent owner sends a letter to the 
developer alleging infringement.82 Suddenly, a company that believed it had 
independently developed the technology becomes a willful infringer and is now 
potentially liable for damages.83 This is another way that a SEP holder can “hold-up” 
an independent developer.84 Furthermore, this is a unique remedy because it seeks 
to punish the infringer, so the court will intentionally award the patentee more than 
the market would have.85 
Enhanced damages are nevertheless inappropriate for patent hold-up. Since 
participating firms already know that there will be some reliance on each other’s 
patents during standardization, companies cannot claim independent development 
as is required by enhanced damages. In addition, poor patent notice during 
standardization creates a level of uncertainty86 that would make it difficult to prove 
that an “infringer” knowingly violated a patent. Therefore, enhanced damages are 
an inadequate remedy for patent hold-up. 
3. Permanent Injunctions 
Permanent injunctions play a critical role in protecting exclusivity and maintaining 
the control that allows a patent holder to reap the market reward following a 
finding of infringement.87 There is a debate, however, over whether injunctive relief 
should be available to parties under RAND commitments.88 A prospective licensee 
would have already spent much of their R&D to comply with the new industry 
standard, as well as relied on the RAND terms.89 The licensee would then face 
significant cost in defending against patent hold-up litigation and would be 
deterred from pursuing more innovation.90 Therefore, although permanent 
injunctions provide important protections for a patent holder, they should not be 
allowed in patent hold-up because they would potentially reward self-serving SEP 
 
claiming willfulness to ‘show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively 
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.’”). 
 82. Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 
149, 164 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 141. 
 86. See supra Part III.A. 
 87. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 143. 
 88. See Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm’n to Commenters (July 23, 2013) (on file 
with Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724 
googlemotorolaletter.pdf. 
 89. See supra Part II.C. 
 90. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 429. 
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holders who pursue injunctive relief solely to demand higher royalties for their 
patents.91 
The Patent Act requires that following a finding of infringement, the court 
should consider “principles of equity” in deciding whether to grant a permanent 
injunction against an infringer.92 Prior to 2006, permanent injunctions were 
virtually automatic after a district court found infringement on a presumption of 
irreparable harm.93 In 2006, however, the Court in eBay v. MercExchange, rejected 
the presumption of irreparable harm in favor of applying “traditional equitable 
principles.”94 These “traditional equitable principles” require that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.95 
Although eBay’s traditional equitable approach seems clear on its face, Chief 
Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion in eBay suggests that applying equitable 
principles permits courts to exercise considerable discretion, which has resulted in 
inconsistent rulings on injunctive relief.96 Chief Justice Roberts observed that courts 
historically granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement and suggested 
that the district courts should use this as a rule of thumb.97 On the other hand, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence alluded that this general rule may be inappropriate 
in some cases, including those involving patent hold-up.98 He observed that SEP 
holders represent a new breed of patentees who “use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees,”99 
and cautioned that SEP holders employ injunctive relief “as a bargaining tool to 
charge exorbitant fees.”100 In such cases, “legal damages may well be sufficient to 
 
 91. See supra Part II.C.  
 92. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
 93. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 7 (internal citation omitted). 
 94. 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).  
 95. Id. at 391 (internal citation omitted). 
 96. See id at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 395. 
 98. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in 
many instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present 
considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”). 
 99. Id. at 396. 
 100. Id. 
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compensate [SEP holders] for the infringement[,] and [that] an injunction may not 
serve the public interest.”101 
The courts are unclear on when SEP holders are entitled to injunctive relief.102 
After the Supreme Court remanded the case, the district court in eBay denied 
injunctive relief to MercExchange.103 The court stated, “MercExchange’s consistent 
practice of licensing, rather than developing, its patents . . . is one factor that [the] 
court must consider in weighing the equities.”104 Therefore, despite the Supreme 
Court’s stated caution against inflexible rules, courts maintain that SEP holder 
status influences whether they will receive injunctive relief.105 
In fact, some courts have granted injunctive relief to SEP holders. For example, 
in Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology 
Inc., a Texas federal court found that the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief 
because it lost irrevocable research opportunities and suffered reputational damage, 
even though it did not license its inventions in the marketplace.106 As a result, courts 
have inconsistently applied eBay’s traditional equitable principles by either granting 
permanent injunctions, regardless of the patent holder’s status, or denying them 
entirely for SEP holders who use them as a means of acquiring more licensing 
fees.107 
IV. Proposed Changes to Standardization 
Since patent hold-up threatens corporate innovation and harms consumers, the 
following discussion proposes changes to standardization that could deter patent 
hold-up since courts, Congress, and administrative agencies have failed to 
adequately address this issue.108 
A. Changes to Standardization 
Despite the SSO’s attempt to facilitate cooperation among technologies, its failure 
to define key concepts, such as “reasonableness” and its inability to enforce 
 
 101. Id. at 396–97. 
 102. See, e.g., id. at 394 (holding that the District Court erred in denying injunctive relief and the Court of 
Appeals erred in granting injunctive relief); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the eBay factors when denying a 
permanent injunction).  
 103. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 556 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 104. Id. at 570. 
 105. See id. at 587–88. 
 106. 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 107. See, e.g., Andrei Iancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent Injunction Decisions: 
A Review of Post-eBay Case Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 395, 404 (2007) (noting that most courts 
since the eBay decision continued to grant permanent injunctions, but denied such relief for patent trolls). 
 108. See supra Parts I, III. 
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previous RAND commitments by SEP holders has resulted in significant 
litigation.109 Therefore, specific changes to standardization may prevent SEP holders 
from engaging in patent hold-up. 
1. Define “Reasonable” Royalty During Standardization 
“Reasonable royalty” is essential to a SEP holder’s RAND commitment, but the SSO 
has failed to provide guidance on this key concept during standardization.110 
Reasonable royalties are based on a “hypothetical negotiation between a willing 
licensor (the patentee) and a willing licensee (the infringer).”111 Therefore, the 
hypothetical negotiation needs to take place during the standardization process and 
under conditions where the alternative technological components are identified. 
Under this approach, all firms are well-informed about the best potential non-
infringing alternatives to the proposed standard and will be able to make an 
informed decision.112 This approach is ideal because it would allow SSOs to take 
each patent holder’s licensing terms and royalty rates into account when deciding 
what technological improvements to use, which would impede a SEP holder’s 
ability to leverage any new bargaining power resulting from being incorporated into 
an SSO standard.113 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.’s 15-factor test to determine 
reasonable royalty during standardization114 is not instructive because the numerous 
factors may create opportunities for a SEP holder to distort their conduct. For 
example, if a SEP holder can satisfy the cost-benefit analysis factor by proving that 
protecting their technology is more desirable,115 then a SEP holder may achieve the 
higher royalty that it sought as part of patent hold-up. 
The SSO should select only a few of Georgia-Pacific’s 15 factors as a guide to 
determine whether the participating firm’s RAND terms are reasonable before 
finalizing the industry standard. Some of the factors that would be worth 
considering include: (1) the utility and advantages of the patent property over the 
 
 109. See supra Part III.B. 
 110. Lemley 2013, supra note 35, at 1146. 
 111. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 143. 
 112. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
The Federal Circuit held that the determinative question is: “had the Infringer not infringed, what would the 
Patent Holder–Licensee have made?”  Id.  In responding to this question, the court required sound economic 
proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the economic picture.  
Id.  A fair and accurate reconstruction of the “but for” market also must take into account, where relevant, 
alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have undertaken had he not infringed.  Id. 
 113. Id. at 1351.  
 114. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (providing a comprehensive list of evidentiary facts that are 
relevant to determine the amount of a reasonable royalty). 
 115. Id. (“The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had 
been used for working out similar results.”). 
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old modes or devices, (2) the amount which a prudent licensee would have been 
willing to pay as a royalty, as well as the amount that would have been acceptable by 
a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license, and (3) the testimony of 
qualified experts. These factors will not only provide the SSO with a value estimate 
of the patent before standardization, but they will also provide the SSO with greater 
support in enforcing a SEP holder’s RAND commitment because SSOs can now 
point to specific guidelines that justify the pre-determined royalty rate.  A smaller 
number of factors would also encourage a SEP holder to comply with their previous 
RAND commitments because they would no longer be able to rely on other factors 
to hide engaging in patent hold-up. 
2. Enforce Previous “RAND” Commitments by Deeming it an Enforceable Agreement 
Since a RAND commitment is nothing more than a promise from a SEP holder to 
license its patent to another competitor,116 the SSO should deem RAND 
commitments as an enforceable agreement. For example, including explicit third-
party beneficiary clauses that grant all prospective licensees the right to enforce the 
RAND commitment would discourage SEP holders from rescinding their original 
promise because SEP holders would now be liable to many licensees—not just the 
specific party that is named.117 In addition, a SEP holder would also be bound by the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel and would most likely not want to risk 
involvement in costly litigation.118 
3. Include a Binding Arbitration Provision 
Once a SEP holder’s prior RAND commitment becomes an enforceable agreement, 
the SSO can include an arbitration provision that would prevent SEP holders from 
flooding the courts with frivolous infringement lawsuits due to their self-serving 
patent hold-up.119 When enforcing an arbitration agreement, the courts and 
arbitrators must “give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the 
parties.”120 Arbitration is considered to be a legitimate judicial venue to resolve 
 
 116. See Ginsburg, Owings & Wright, supra note 5, at 1. 
 117. General Contract Clauses: Third-party Beneficiaries, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/6-519-7 
630 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
 118. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing how Microsoft alleged 
that Motorola improperly refused to offer it licenses for patents essential to industrial standards on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms, asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and 
declaratory relief). 
 119. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By agreeing 
to arbitrate . . . , [a party] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration.”). 
 120. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
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costly patent disputes.121 In fact, the FTC has used judicially-facilitated negotiation 
in settling its own patent hold-up suits.122 
In addition, arbitration minimizes the courts’ inconsistent rulings on patent 
hold-up cases.123 Arbitrators are typically “those who are prominent and 
experienced members of the specific business community in which the dispute to be 
arbitrated arose.”124 Therefore, the arbitrator would be a neutral and knowledgeable 
third party who thoroughly understands standardization procedures and would 
decide the infringement allegations fairly to both parties involved.125 Therefore, 
instituting an arbitration provision is a simple fix that will not only effectively 
decrease a SEP holder’s ability to engage in patent hold-up, but also create little 
disruption to the standardization process once RAND terms become an enforceable 
agreement. 
B. Prevent Access to the International Trade Commission 
Eliminating the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) as a potential judicial 
resource is important for patent hold-up because ITC orders can prohibit 
standardized technological products from being sold to consumers domestically 
and internationally. The ITC is a quasi-judicial, independent federal agency 
established by Congress to investigate a wide-range of trade matters, which may 
include products that are developed by SEP holders.126 After finding patent 
infringement, under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC will issue either a 
cease and desist order, which prohibits a defendant from selling infringing articles 
out of U.S. inventory,127 or an exclusion order, which directs the U.S. Customs 
Service to bar infringing articles from entering the U.S.128 
 
 121. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring a national policy in favor of 
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 126. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 9. 
 127. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 128. Id. § 1337(f).  
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Although all federal courts must follow the eBay’s equitable standard when 
deciding whether to grant an injunction, the ITC is not required to follow such a 
standard.129 This discrepancy has significantly increased litigation because SEP 
holders have turned to this court to grant injunctions despite violating their RAND 
terms.130 Therefore, drafting an arbitration provision that limits patent infringement 
proceedings to U.S. courts during standardization will prevent SEP holders from 
retreating to the ITC for more favorable treatment. 
IV. Conclusion 
Patent hold-up is not only a significant legal bottleneck,131 but also presents a losing 
situation for both the producer and the consumer. If a producer develops a product 
that is unknowingly covered by a patent, the producer faces expensive and time-
consuming litigation.132 At the same time, if the infringer chooses to negotiate 
royalties with a SEP holder, the cost for product development skyrockets as the 
infringer would now need to account for higher royalties than anticipated to pursue 
its product innovation.133 The consumer loses financially, as it has to pay for higher 
prices for this patent infringement litigation and personally, as the number of 
product options decreases.134 Therefore, it is important for courts, administrative 
agencies, and Congress to provide more guidance on the limits of injunctive relief 
in patent hold-up and make the changes to standardization, which would prevent 
SEP holders from continually interfering with innovation for their own financial 
benefit.
 
 129. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Given the different 
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